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This is the report of the third Hearing for the LSE Commission on the Future of Britain 
in Europe focusing on ‘Social Europe, EU Employment Legislation & the UK’s Labour 
Market’, which took place on Wednesday 16 December 2015 at the LSE. The Hearing was 
convened by Dr Steve Coulter and Dr Bob Hancké. The convenors are extremely grateful 
to the 16 participants in the hearing who contributed to a lively and informative debate. 
A list of their names and organisations can be found in the appendix. We also gratefully 
acknowledge the help of Pieter Tuytens with preparing and recording the hearing and 
drawing up the report of the meeting, and Amir Rozlan who provided research backup. 
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1. Introduction
The EU’s involvement in employment policy is controversial for a number of reasons. First, 
by attempting to impose minimum standards across countries with diverse labour markets 
it arguably interferes with member states’ discretion to regulate these in accordance with 
national economic models. Second, the policymaking process in Brussels is said by its critics 
to be opaque and undemocratic, sometimes producing flawed regulation. 
Concerns about the effect of EU employment regulation on employers’ costs and the 
operation of the UK labour market had therefore been expected to form a key part 
of the government’s renegotiation of the terms of the UK’s membership of the EU. 
The Conservatives’ 2010 election manifesto had pledged to repatriate key powers over 
employment and social legislation, and the Coalition Agreement signed with its Liberal 
Democrat allies after the election committed the government to limit the application 
of the Working Time Directive. However, in the event, these pledges were toned down 
significantly, with David Cameron’s letter to Donald Tusk on 10 November 2015 calling 
instead for a cut in the total regulatory burden on business alongside a clear commitment 
to boosting competitiveness. 
One significant uncertainty concerns what a vote for Brexit would mean for the UK’s 
economic relationships with remaining EU members. Some supporters of Brexit advocate 
the UK continuing as a member of the European Single Market (ESM). The models for this 
arrangement would be Norway or Switzerland, which are outside the formal structures 
of the EU but can continue to sell goods and services to EU members. However, both 
countries have to continue to adhere to many EU regulations as the price of this access, 
somewhat undermining the argument for quitting the ESM for this kind of arrangement 
- at least from the point of view of easing the regulatory burden. The main alternative to 
the current status quo, therefore, is probably quitting both the EU and ESM in order to 
focus on developing economic relationships with the rest of the world and allowing the 
UK government to begin the process of disentangling UK from EU law. 
Despite many disagreements over the details and extent of EU influence over employment 
regulation, most business groups are, however, against Brexit as they believe the costs 
on them imposed by the EU are outweighed by the benefits of access to the ESM, which 
account for nearly half of UK trade. Surveys and consultations show continued, albeit 
qualified, support for UK membership of the EU among the three main employers’ 
organisations, the Confederation of British Industry; the Institute of Directors; and the 
British Chambers of Commerce. On the other hand, YouGov polling reveals a split in 
opinion between large, export-oriented firms and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, 
which are much more evenly divided on the issue. 
Politically, both main parties are divided over Europe, with labour market regulation a key 
fault line. Pro-Brexit Conservatives have attacked the EU over loss of sovereignty and the 
impact of Brussels-inspired ‘red tape’ on business. Both the leading Conservative Brexit 
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figures, the Justice Secretary Michael Gove and former London Mayor Boris Johnson, have 
suggested a future for the UK outside the ESM and subject to global trading rules. In his 
speech on 19th April Gove said this would allow the UK to cut the regulatory burden on 
the economy. 
Although Gove did not single out employment regulation, this prospect alarms trade 
unions and the Labour Party. Many on the Left, including the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn 
and Len McCluskey the head of the UNITE union, are suspicious of the EU in its current 
form as they believe it prioritises market freedoms at the expense of workers’ protection. 
However, their increasing alarm at prospects of the free-trading, low regulation, vision of 
the UK’s future proffered by many in the Brexit camp have recently encouraged them to 
side with Remain. Trade unions supporting Remain argue that EU employment directives 
protect workers from exploitation by unscrupulous employers, and that social partner 
involvement in the formulation of EU policy increases its legitimacy. Corbyn’s EU speech in 
April warned of a ‘bonfire of workers’ rights’ if the UK left the EU, and most of the large 
unions have now joined Labour in officially backing Remain. 
Table 1. Is the UK labour market over-regulated? 
Protection of permanent workers against individual and collective dismissals  
(years 2013-2014). Source: OECD
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2.   Summary
The implications of the Brexit referendum 
for labour market regulation will obviously 
depend on the outcome. In the event of 
a vote to leave the EU, it will hinge on 
subsequent decisions taken about the UK’s 
future economic relationship with the 
remaining EU members. These are some  
of the likely outcomes considered by  
the Hearing:
1)  A vote to Remain in the EU would 
be unlikely to be followed by much 
renegotiation of EU employment law, 
since both the motive and opportunity 
for this would have been removed.
2)  If the UK voted to leave the EU but 
negotiated continued access to the 
European Single Market (ESM), the 
terms of this access likely to be imposed 
on the UK would probably include 
full adherence to EU employment 
regulations, implying no major change 
to the regulatory burden.
3)  If, on the other hand, a post-Brexit 
UK focused instead on developing 
global trading relations with emerging 
markets and the Commonwealth, it 
would theoretically enjoy more room 
for manoeuvre over domestic labour 
market regulation and could shape 
these in accordance with its desired 
position within global production 
chains. However, the reality is that 
EU employment law is now so deeply 
embedded in UK case law that 
disentangling the two would be a very 
slow and costly process and would not 
necessarily result in better regulation 
or a major reduction in the overall 
costs of compliance. Therefore, a Brexit 
would probably make little difference 
to the regulatory burden on UK firms, 
certainly in the short and medium term.
Other issues:
•  The current cost of EU employment 
regulation to the UK economy 
is difficult to quantify fairly and 
accurately, although employers 
complain that it is a significant burden 
on them and that much legislation 
is poorly drafted and subject to 
further ‘gold plating’ by the British 
government. 
•  Some employers, in addition, argue that 
the UK’s flexible, service-based economy 
is hampered by employment legislation 
that imposes steep compliance costs and 
restricts their ability to react quickly to 
changing market conditions.
•  The net cost-benefit of the effect of 
EU membership on businesses also 
varies by size of company and sector, 
and business (and trade unions) have 
diverse views on membership of the 
EU and participation in the ESM. 
Larger, more export-oriented firms are 
generally prepared to cope with the 
accompanying regulations and accept 
the point of a ‘social dimension’ to the 
ESM, yet some smaller firms approach 
this trade-off differently and find this 
an unacceptable burden. 
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•  Trade unions are generally pro-EU 
but have concerns about the future 
direction of the ESM undermining social 
standards. Unions argue that complaints 
about the ‘cost’ of employment 
regulation fails to include its beneficial 
impact, for instance in the areas of 
Health and Safety and equal treatment 
of workers.
•  In fact, Social Dialogue at EU level over 
employment matters is not particularly 
contentious. Both employers and trade 
unions argue that mechanisms for 
‘Social Dialogue’ between the two at 
EU level over employment regulation 
can work well and may even improve 
regulation in some cases. 
•  However, there are concerns from 
employers about the ‘activism’ of  
the European Court of Justice and 
European Parliament which they  
believe frequently exceeds their remit  
and contributes to bad policymaking.
8 |  Social Europe, EU Employment Legislation and the UK Labour Market
3.  Summary of the Brexit Hearing on  
Labour Market Regulation:
What is the overall impact of EU 
employment regulations on the UK 
economy and labour market?
The Hearing began with the views of some 
of the business groups present. Employers 
said they were not necessarily against 
all regulation stemming from Europe. 
Regulation is not automatically bad, as 
there are several areas where common 
rules make sense. Yet in other areas, both 
EU and British transposed regulation can 
be burdensome. Polls of businesses tend 
to show that many find EU employment 
regulation (including health and safety 
regulation) unhelpful. The main quoted 
reasons for this: it costs money; it decreases 
the willingness to hire; employers are 
often brought to tribunes which influences 
hiring decisions. This had most impact on 
young and marginalised people. 
Further issues include the problem of 
‘gold-plating’ – where British politicians 
use EU regulation as a scapegoat to push 
through costly regulations which would 
otherwise be politically unfeasible (e.g. 
working time). This negatively influences 
business confidence in EU membership. 
Furthermore, many members feel 
that, while they follow the rules, other 
businesses in the EU do not always do so. 
Many regulations have a disproportionate 
impact on small, export-driven companies. 
They do not have the means to track EU 
and British regulation, making it difficult 
to anticipate changes in these (e.g. 
Working Time Directive). 
One key problem with the EU’s ‘Social 
Dimension’ is the democratic deficit.  
As people are not really involved in voting 
on EU affairs, this creates a discrepancy 
between policy making efforts and what 
people want. In particular, some firms 
believe the EU fails to deal with the more 
important issues (such as trade and other 
outward oriented issues), and spends too 
much effort on inward-oriented debates. 
What do businesses think are 
the main problems with EU 
employment regulations?
Complaints about regulation were, 
nevertheless, qualified by the business 
community’s very diverse views; while 
regulations can be burdensome (especially 
for small businesses), larger companies do 
see the point of a social dimension in the 
single market. Leaving this aside, the issues 
businesses have tend to be more practical. 
Much of this has to do with the fact that 
the EU has become much more diverse 
since the 2003 enlargement. Three main 
concerns often emerge with CBI members, 
for example. First, there is a concern that 
Brussels is a self-sustained bureaucracy, cut 
off from the experiences of many of the 
businesses around Europe. The risk is that 
consequences for practical implementation 
are lost from sight during the long process 
of adapting legislation.
‘One key problem with the  
EU’s ‘Social Dimension’ is that 
of a democratic deficit.’
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Secondly, there is a problem with 
implementation of EU Directives in UK 
legislation. ‘Gold-plating’, where civil 
servants add an additional layer of 
complexity to a regulation, is a very real 
issue and often happens when ministers 
feel very constrained in how they design 
legislation - simply because they wish to 
avoid a challenge from the European Court 
of Justice. Thirdly, one has to take into 
account that things are done differently 
across countries, creating unequal impact 
of regulation; and in the UK flexibility is 
very important. 
Transposition of regulation is a significant 
factor. Businesses often end up in trouble 
because of technical transgression rather 
than challenging the spirit of regulations. 
Especially, regulations translated into 
common law often have such complicated 
formulations that it is unsurprising that 
they end up being challenged. This is 
not the result of business interference in 
the legal process, as frequently claimed, 
but because of the different legal system 
(common versus civic law). 
Another concern is activism within the 
European Parliament. For example, 
while most businesses had no problems 
with the initial formulation of the WTD, 
several changes were put on the agenda 
by individual MEPs, despite the costly 
impact they would have on member 
states – creating uncertainty for business. 
One should, however, not expect a big 
difference, let alone a nirvana where you 
have far less regulation. 
What are the benefits of EU 
employment regulation?
The view from the trade unions was that 
sensible employment regulation does not 
hinder growth. Instead, it secures growth 
that is sustainable. Issues which are often 
presented as costs are not costs per se. 
For example, benefits for workers such 
as holidays, breaks, or health and safety 
provisions should not be considered as a 
red tape issue, but as important elements 
of a healthy working environment. 
Much of the uncertainty and 
additional legal activity associated with 
implementation of EU regulation is the 
result of poor UK implementation. As UK 
policymakers try to minimise the impact 
of EU regulation when transposing and 
implementing these rules, they add 
unnecessary complexity and hence legal 
uncertainty. The business lobby is very 
successful in pressing for minimising impact 
(the main origin of gold-plating), yet 
simpler implementation of EU rules would 
also benefit businesses by creating less 
legal confusion. 
With respect to the fear of enforcement 
and employment tribunals, unions argue 
that this is, in reality, a bogeyman. There 
are very few workers willing to take 
their boss to a tribunal (there are hardly 
any cases of a tribunal resulting from 
breaching the Agency Worker Directive 
regulations, for example). The UK has 
a very basic implementation of many 
regulations anyway - employers were 
usually able to sidestep regulation, and it  
is often very weakly enforced in practice. 
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It was also pointed out that the UK is 
already among those countries with the 
lightest labour market regulation (see Fig. 
1), making it hard to see how it would be 
possible to deregulate further without 
seriously undermining workers’ rights. 
Furthermore, the OECD has found it 
difficult to identify a clear overall causal 
link between the strength of employment 
protection and unemployment. 
The original inspiration for a social 
dimension was the understanding that 
economic integration would create tensions 
in the social sphere (such as firm closures 
and widespread redundancies). The principle 
of a social dimension is thus to facilitate 
change rather than to prevent it; so not 
to stop job losses, but to allow workers to 
cope with job loss. Similarly, other values 
such as free movement aim to create a 
common floor so workers can be confident 
that they are treated similarly everywhere. 
The real problem is that the EU currently 
lacks a proper social dimension (especially 
regarding Southern-European countries). 
A certain degree of social standards is 
therefore perhaps necessary to prevent 
fear of social dumping and thus facilitate 
opening up the Single Market. And what 
would be achieved by leaving the EU, other 
than creating regulatory uncertainty? 
It is politically inconceivable to repeal 
existing measures such as health and safety 
standards or parental leave. In any case, 
there is no alternative to implementing 
measures such as the Working Time 
Directive – as shown by Norway – if you 
want to remain in the Single Market. The 
emphasis should be on outcome-focused 
regulation where the focus is less on saying 
what business should do, and more on 
what should be achieved (as happened,  
for example, with flexible working). 
Can the ‘cost of EU employment 
regulation therefore even be 
quantified sensibly? 
Some calculations estimate that EU social 
legislation costs the economy many billions 
of pounds a year. The flaw in these kinds 
of estimates is that they tend to include 
as costs things that UK employers would 
probably do anyway, significantly inflating 
the potential savings accruing to employers 
from Brexit. One could therefore question 
the assumptions behind a simple cost 
calculation. Equally, one could also point 
to the benefits which remain uncalculated 
(e.g. happy workers are productive workers 
etc.). Equally, however, trade union 
analyses of the issue tended to gloss over 
the fact that regulation costs firms money 
and therefore could destroys jobs. So how 
to manage this?
The British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) 
stopped calculating its ‘Burden Barometer’ 
in 2009 because focusing on the ‘stock’ of 
the burden made increasingly less sense 
as the number became extremely high. 
Instead the focus shifted to measuring the 
impact of the ‘flow’ of new regulations. 
Quantification is most useful when 
looking at individual measures and their 
potential impact, rather than at existing 
regulation which is not going anywhere. 
What is also needed, whether we are 
talking about measuring benefits or costs, 
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is a better impact assessment regime at 
European level (not just British level) and 
better communication of these impact 
assessments in member states. 
Unions argue that it is very difficult to 
quantify certain things – for example 
the costs following from the missed 
opportunity to include unions and  
their expertise while designing rules. 
Hence, lacking Social Dialogue institutions 
presents the UK with important costs 
which are not taken into account. 
Categorising things as costs or benefits 
is not a straightforward task – it involves 
important decisions regarding the kind of 
society we want. For example, maternity 
rights can be considered a massive cost by 
employers, but it can also be considered 
to be an important societal achievement. 
Perhaps cost-benefit analysis should in 
fact be a ‘multi goal exercise’ where you 
analyse the costs and benefits in respect 
of each goal, but where the decision 
regarding the trade-off between these 
goals is a political rather than an  
economic decision. 
Despite the difficulties, business groups 
pointed out that some of the worst policy 
decisions are those taken without a decent 
assessment based on evidence (especially in 
labour market policies, these assessments 
tend to be minimal, with a quick jump 
towards the conclusion). Hence one  
should not disregard cost-benefit exercises 
too quickly.
How feasible would it be for the 
UK to disentangle itself from EU 
employment law? 
Disentangling the UK from the EU could 
potentially be very complicated. So would it 
be worth it? To some extent this depends on 
assessments about the degree to which the 
UK economy and labour market really are 
different from those of other EU countries. 
A representative from the legal sector 
argued that there is no alternative in 
terms of disentanglement – if you want 
to have access to the Single Market, 
then you have to implement the same 
regulations you would hope to disentangle 
from. Even Norway has to comply with 
these, even though it would be much 
easier for Norway to disentangle its 
economy than the UK (Norway is wealthy 
because of immobile natural resources, 
the UK because of very mobile sectors). 
If the UK were to decide to exit the ESM 
nevertheless, this would primarily be a 
bonanza for lawyers.
If the UK chooses to leave the EU this will 
likely be immediately followed by new 
negotiations with the same EU countries 
for entering the Single Market as a non-EU 
member. However, the EU member countries 
will establish their negotiation position in 
such a way as to communicate to others that 
leaving the EU is a very bad idea – so one 
should expect a very hostile attitude to any 
British demand. The EU would be in serious 
danger of unravelling if the British leave 
and are therefore disinclined to encourage 
others to follow suit by offering attractive 
terms to the UK post-Brexit. 
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What is the role of Social Dialogue 
in formulating EU employment 
regulation, and does this represent 
a problem for the UK?
The involvement of both trade unions 
and employers at the EU level in the 
formulation of policy (‘Social Dialogue’) 
represents a very different tradition 
from the UK, where governments may 
on occasion seek the views of either but 
otherwise retain autonomy in devising 
policy. Does this create a problem when 
transposing EU regulations into the UK?
Interestingly, employers at the Hearing 
were not necessarily against Social 
Dialogue. One business group said the 
process is sometimes useful for shaping 
debates between unions and employers, 
although achieving comprehensive 
agreement can be hard on the more 
technical issues. There are even instances 
where a lack of Social Dialogue may have 
contributed to bad policy owing to the 
Commission’s lack of engagement with 
the real world. On the other hand, others 
cautioned that the UK’s previous experience 
with Social Dialogue had not been positive; 
one business representative recalled his 
experience as Secretary to the National 
Economic Development Council (1988-1992) 
and said that unions saw their role on the 
NEDC as being to argue with Conservative 
Ministers rather than to debate with their 
CBI employer social partners
Unions argue that it should be recognised 
that trade unions are simply part of a 
wider citizenship. The Social Dialogue has 
been largely missing in many important EU 
discussions (e.g. TTIP, TiSA, SETA). Here it 
were trade unions, NGOs and citizens who 
fought hard to get Social Dialogue on the 
agenda. Still there often is an imbalance, 
whereby many of the important social 
clauses welcomed by trade unions are 
not mandatory to the UK government – 
so leaving the EU or not will not make 
much of a difference in those instances. 
Nevertheless, Social Dialogue remains 
very useful in the context of debates 
on parental leave, for example. Social 
Dialogue offers the opportunity to educate 
member states who have less progressive 
views on such matters. 
It could also be argued that the missing 
Social Dialogue in the UK is one explanation 
for earlier discussed issues such as gold-
plating and the legalistic tradition in the 
UK. Coordination between social partners 
creates higher levels of confidence, reducing 
the need for laws and lawyers. In this sense, 
it is very true that one size does not fit all. 
This is in fact already the case in Europe 
– there are many areas where there is no 
binding EU legislation and no harmonisation 
(e.g. employment law in Germany is very 
different from the UK), and this is the way 
it should be. Making all countries do the 
same thing would also not be good in terms 
of ‘diversification’, which at system level is 
the best approach to deal with the risk that 
some policies might turn out to be bad.
What would Brexit mean for 
migrants and the UK labour market?
A key argument for Brexit is that the UK 
could thereby regain control of its borders 
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and restrict migration. What would be the 
consequences for the labour market?
It was generally agreed that limiting 
foreign workers would reduce economic 
growth. Business groups pointed out 
that labour shortages are already 
developing. The hospitality industry, for 
example, depends heavily on workers 
from outside the UK. Participants in the 
Hearing pointed to the importance of 
push factors alongside the discussed pull 
factors – with the biggest push factor 
being unemployment in the home country. 
If the government would like to reduce 
the number of people coming to the UK 
then it should try to increase growth and 
employment in the other countries. 
A former senior politician involved in 
business regulation wondered how 
changes in unemployment benefits 
could be made in a way that would be 
legal. Perhaps one could try to establish 
an immigration break, but this requires 
approval from the Commission and it is 
very difficult to enforce at the frontiers. 
In the end, he did not expect the 
government’s proposals to make a real 
difference. 
One area of puzzlement was over the 
fact that public opinion was concerned 
about the fiscal costs of immigration, even 
though studies find that non-UK workers 
contribute more than they take in benefits. 
So government proposals to restrict 
benefits would actually undermine fiscal 
contributions. 
Is the UK’s ‘flexible’, market-oriented 
model of capitalism compatible 
with the more stakeholder-oriented 
European models? If not, is this an 
argument for Brexit?
One argument deployed by those sceptical 
of UK membership of the EU is that the 
competitive success of the UK economy 
hinges on flexibility in wages and 
employment conditions. Arguably, this is 
undermined by regulation originating in 
an EU dominated by countries adhering 
to the European ‘Social Model’, which 
embraces a more regulated, stakeholder-
oriented system. 
Some participants argued that it is very 
difficult to talk about an EU ‘social model’ 
as de facto diversity is already built into 
the institutional infrastructure. There 
are different regimes with different 
requirements, so it would be impossible to 
impose homogeneity. Moreover, it is not 
clear that arguments about a distinctive  
UK approach lead to a Brexit conclusion. 
There are good reasons to rethink whether 
the UK current model is as efficient as it 
could be. Change to the better is possible – 
just as the Nordics did not always look like 
they do now. 
We also have to distinguish between the 
UK as an actual model of capitalism and the 
‘ideal’ liberal market model in its pure form. 
As an actual model, for example, it is very 
reliant on foreign direct investment – the 
vast majority of which is attracted to the UK 
by our place in the ESM - and it is also reliant 
on importing skilled workers from elsewhere 
in Europe. If the UK wants to leave, it might 
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have no choice but to become fully flexible. 
As this would imply becoming even more 
a ‘playground for the very rich’, this is not 
what most politicians want. 
A former senior Minister recalls that 
during his time in government, there was 
a peaceful coexistence with the European 
social model. The only two controversies 
were the Agency Workers Directive and the 
Working Time Directive – yet as the UK has 
opt-outs for both it was not really a deal 
buster. Therefore, differences between 
the European social model and the British 
social model should not be exaggerated, 
and are in any case no basis for a vote for 
or against Brexit. 
Trade union representatives, in fact, 
contend that Social Europe hardly 
exists due to the lack of a real social 
underpinning to the EU’s economic model. 
Additionally, what matters is the lack of 
global social underpinning - Europe is 
increasingly less able to introduce social 
elements into global treaties. 
It might therefore seem strange to propose 
to leave the EU just as the EU seems to 
be liberalising and moving towards the 
position of the UK. This is especially visible 
in the Southern-European countries which 
are pressured to become more like the 
UK, not less. Furthermore, it could be 
argued that the UK is massively freeriding 
on the skill production in other European 
countries. They train people and we take 
them in without many restrictions – why 
object to this? 
The Brexit question also needs to be put  
in the context of the global economy. 
Most companies in goods markets depend 
on a complex global value chain. So what 
matters is how the UK is integrated in 
the European economic area. If the EU is 
not the area on which economic decisions 
depend, then a Brexit might not be a 
completely crazy idea; however, if the 
EU is very important in the supply chain 
of British firms, then Brexit could be a 
major factor in location with negative 
consequences. 
Others point out that an overly simple 
depiction of the UK itself as permanently 
deregulating is not correct. One expert 
involved in government points to 
five areas where the British labour 
market is more regulated than it was 
five years ago: shared parental leave, 
expanded flexible working rights, public 
contracts, stakeholder pensions, and the 
apprenticeship levy. These are clearly 
movements in the opposite direction to 
the standard liberal British stereotype. 
Much ‘home-grown’ regulation is, for 
example, aimed at reducing the binary 
choice between working and caring, 
and is therefore likely to be extremely 
popular. Also, many of these regulations 
involve passing the costs of social goals to 
employers, representing a subtle shift in 
the UK model.
‘...differences between 
the European and British 
social models should not be 
exaggerated, and are in any 
case no basis for a vote for  
or against Brexit.’
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•  Brexit might have profound long-
term implications for the structure 
and orientation of the UK economy, 
and could eventually afford the 
government more autonomy to shape 
the organisation and regulation of 
the UK economy and labour market. 
However, the potentially ‘liberating’ 
effect of quitting the EU should not be 
overestimated, particularly in the short 
to medium term. 
•  This is not necessarily an argument 
for the status quo, however. Most 
participants at the Hearing agreed that 
there are significant flaws in the way 
employment and other policies are 
made in the EU. In the event of Remain, 
the UK government should push for a 
less intrusive and more context-sensitive 
approach on the part of the EU towards 
formulating labour market policy. 
•  In particular, EU employment policy 
should take more account of national 
differences. The structure of the 
UK economy and labour market is 
sufficiently different from that of 
many Continental economies to 
warrant concerns about moves towards 
further harmonisation of employment 
standards. In the UK flexibility and 
orientation towards service sectors are 
distinctive features of the economy 
which may be undermined by obtrusive 
moves to enforce common standards 
with other countries with different 
labour markets. This should not be 
exaggerated as a factor, however,  
and is not a reason to vote for or 
against Brexit.
4.   Conclusions/Policy Implications: 
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Saul Estrin Professor of Management & Head of the 
Department of Management, LSE
Jonathan Hopkin Associate Professor of Comparative Politics, 
Department of Government, LSE
Sampson Low Head of Policy, Unison
Adam Marshall Director of Policy and External Affairs, British 
Chambers of Commerce (BCC)
Michael Martins Economics Analyst, Institute of Directors (IoD)
Jeff Masters Policy Adviser
Mark Paulson Head of Family and Social Justice, The Law 
Society
Allison Roche Policy Officer, Unison
Waltraud Schelkle Associate Professor of Political Economy at the 
European Institute
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